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IS GRAVEL A MINERAL? THE IMPACT OF WESTERN




The Stock Raising Homestead Act of 19161 (SRHA) reserved to the
federal government all coal and other minerals contained within the lands
patented under the Act.' Today this reservation affects over 33 million
acres of land in the Western United States.3 With the recent resource
development of these lands, questions concerning what types of substances
are included as minerals under the SRHA reservation have arisen. In Watt
v. Western Nuclear, Inc.,4 the Supreme Court determined that gravel was a
reserved mineral under the SRHA reservation. The tests used by the
Supreme Court in reaching this decision will affect what will be considered
a reserved mineral under the SRHA mineral reservation in the future.
II. FACTS
Western Nuclear purchased land on which an open gravel pit was
located. The original conveyance of the land was made in 1926 by Patent
Number 974013, issued pursuant to the SRHA. The patent reserved all the
coal and other minerals to the federal government. Western Nuclear, as
part of its mining and milling operations, used gravel obtained from the
open pit.
In 1975, the Wyoming Office of the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) cited Western Nuclear for trespass upon the mineral estate. After
a hearing, the BLM determined that the gravel on and underlying Western
Nuclear's land was reserved to the federal government.5
1. Stock Raising Homestead Act of 1916, ch. 9,39 Stat. 862 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 291-301
(1976)), suspended by The Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, ch. 865,48 Stat. 1269, (codified at 43 U.S.C.
J§ 310-316(o) (1976)) repealedby the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-579, § 702, 90 Stat. 2787 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (Supp. 111978)) [hereinafter cited as
SRHA]. Valid existing patents were unaffected by the repeal.
2. 43 U.S.C. § 999 (1976).
3. Department of the Interior, Report of the Director of the Bureau of Land Management,
Statistical Appendix, Table 17 at 22 (1948).
4. 103 S. Ct. 2218 (1983).
5. Id. at 2222.
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Western Nuclear appealed the decision to the Interior Board of Land
Appeals, which affirmed the BLM holding.6 Thereafter, Western Nuclear
petitioned for review in the United States District Court for the District of
Wyoming. The district court also affirmed the BLM decision stating, "it is
evident from the legislative history, contemporaneous definitions and court
decisions that the mineral reservation in the SRHA of 1916 is broad
enough to include gravel as a mineral." 8
Western Nuclear then appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit. 9 That court reversed the district court's holding,
reasoning that gravel was not a reserved mineral under the SRHA
reservation."0
The case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 1 The
Court, in a 5-4 decision, reversed the court of appeals."2 In concluding that
gravel was a reserved mineral under the SRHA reservation,13 the Court
stated that a substance would be considered a reserved mineral if it could
be "removed from the soil . . . [and] used for commercial purposes."1
III. BACKGROUND
In 1862, Congress enacted the Homestead Act"8 which allowed any
person twenty-one years of age or older to enter upon and cultivate 160
acres of land. 6 Mineral lands were exempted from this sale by the General
Mining Law of 1872.17 Land was considered mineral in character if it was
more valuable for its minerals than for any other purpose.18 However, the
system was abused because of inadequate methods of classification. 19 As a
result, nearly all of the mineral resources in the eastern part of the United
States were privately acquired.20 President Theodore Roosevelt acted to
prevent further abuse by withdrawing from all forms of entry 66 million
6. 85 I.D. 129 (1978).
7. Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Andrus, 475 F. Supp. 654 (D. Wyo. 1979), 664 F.2d 234 (10th Cir.
1981), sub nom. Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2218 (1983).
8. Western Nuclear, 475 F. Supp. at 663.
9. Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Andrus, 664 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1981).
10. Id. at 242.
11. Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc. 103 S. Ct. 2218 (1983).
12. Id. at 2219.
13. Id. at 2232.
14. Id. at 2228.
15. 43 U.S.C. §§ 161-263 (1970), repealed by the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of
1976, § 702, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2787 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1978)).
16. 43 U.S.C. § 161 (1970).
17. 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54 (1976).
18. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526 (1903).
19. Reeves, Geraud & Moran, Development of Federally Reserved Minerals in Fee Lands, 1
AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 3.1, 467 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Found. 1982).
20. HIBBARD, A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LAND POLICIES at 515-17 (1965).
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acres of land presumed valuable for coal.21
In order to preserve minerals for future public use while allowing
agricultural settlement, President Roosevelt urged an amendment to the
homestead laws reserving the minerals from surface patents.2 He pointed
out to Congress that some public lands could be beneficially used for
production of subsurface mineral fuels, as well as for agriculture."
The Coal Lands Acts of 19094 and 1910,25 severed rights to coal from
the surface estate.28 These Acts allowed agricultural entries on the lands
previously withdrawn by President Roosevelt, but reserved the rights to the
coal to the federal government2'
The Agricultural Entry Act of 191428 allowed entry for agricultural
purposes under the homestead or desert land laws to lands withdrawn or
classified as valuable for phosphate, nitrate, potash, oil, gas or asphaltic
materials. The Act provided for a patent to the surface estate and reserved
the particular minerals for which the land had been withdrawn.'
By 1916 Congress recognized that the lands still available for
homesteading in the west were suitable primarily for grazing rather than
farming.' 0 A larger grant of land was necessary to support a farm/ranch.
The Stock Raising Homestead Act of 191631 increased the amount of land
a homesteader could claim from 160 to 640 acres.' 2 The passage of this act
marked the defeat of a movement to retain government ownership of the
remaining lands and lease them for grazing." Thus, the Jeffersonian ideal
of farmers making the land their own through individual efforts was
preserved." Since many valuable minerals were passing into private
21. Id. at 523.
22. 41 CONG. REc. 2806-08 (1907).
23. Id.
24. 30 U.S.C. § 81 (1976).
25. 30 U.S.C. § 85 (1976).
26. Mall, Federal Mineral Reservations, 20 RocKY MT. MIN. L. INsr. 399 (1975) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Mall]. The 1909 Act allowed an entryman who had entered lands which were later
withdrawn from entry as coal lands to complete his settlement, but he received a patent which reserved
rights to coal. The 1910 Act opened withdrawn coal lands to agricultural entry, subject to a reservation
of the coal.
27. Id. at 403.
28. 30 U.S.C. §§ 121-123 (1976).
29. Id.
30. Gallinger and Arnott, The Rights of Surface Owners Over Federally Reserved Coal as
Defined By FederalSurface MiningLegislation, 1 PuB. LAND L. REv. 57,58 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Gallinger].
31. SRHA, supra note 1.
32. Id. at § 291.
33. Gallinger, supra note 30, at 59.
34. 52 CONG. Ric. 520-521 (1915) (remarks of Rep. Baker): "One of the purposes of the bill is
to restore and improve the grazing capacity of the lands.... and at the same time to furnish homes
thereon for the people of this country .... We want homes and not tenants even if the Government of the
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ownership under previous government acts, the SRHA simply provided for
a patent which reserved "all the coal and other minerals"3 5 to the federal
government.
IV. MINERAL RESERVATIONS
The common law of private severances has little applicability to the
questions raised by patent severances. 6 "Private mineral severances are
construed according to the specific intent of the parties as shown by the
language used in the deed."137 On the other hand, "[t] he rights and duties of
those who claim through statutory patents are governed by the language of
the statute."3 " It is the general rule that "[p] atent mineral reservations are
construed according to the purpose for which the legislative body granted
the surface and reserved the minerals. Therefore, the statute authorizing
the patent controls the reservation if the patent language is erroneous or
even if the reservation is omitted from the patent.""9
Federal grants are to be construed broadly in favor of the government
with no rights passing by implication.4" However, federal grants of land
resources are "to receive such a construction as will carry out the intent of
Congress, "41 and "are not to be so construed as to defeat the intent of the
legislature, or to withhold what is given either expressly or by necessary or
fair implication .... 42
V. LEGISLATIVE INTENT
To ascertain the intent of a Congressional act one "must look to the
condition of the country when the acts were passed as well as the purpose
declared on [the Act's] face .... ,43 Legislative history, consisting of floor
debates, committee reports, and amendments may be used to aid in the
construction of a statute.44
In Western Nuclear, the Supreme Court majority did not look to the
congressional intent of the SRHA, but instead they looked to Congress'
United States should be the landlord."
35. SRHA, supra note 1, at § 299 (emphasis added).
36. Twitty, Law of Subjacent Support and the Right to Totally Destroy Surface In Mining
Operations, 6 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 497 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Twitty].
37. Mall, supra note 26, at 410.
38. Gallinger, supra note 30, at 60.
39. Mall, supra note 26 at 410.
40. United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 112, 116 (1957).
41. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 682 (1979), citing Winona & St. Peter R.R.
Co. v. Barney, 113 U.S. 618, 625 (1885).
42. Leo Sheep at 682-83, citing United States v. Denver & Rio Grande R.R. Co., 150 U.S. 1, 14
(1893).
43. Winona & St. Peter R.R. v. Barney, 113 U.S. 618, 625 (1885).
44. Mall, supra note 26, at 411.
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underlying purpose in, creating the mineral reservation within the SRHA.
They reasoned that "Congress' purpose in severing the surface state from
the mineral estate was to encourage the concurrent development of both
the surface and subsurface of SRHA lands."'45 The majority concluded
that this purpose was "best served by construing the mineral reservation to
encompass gravel." 6
The Supreme Court minority, however, took a broader view and
looked to the Congressional intent and policy considerations behind the
enactment of the SRHA. They reasoned that the ultimate Congressional
purpose for enacting the homestead laws was to settle the west 7 They
concluded that it was the general belief of Congress that more states were
needed "where each citizen is the sovereign of a portion of the soil, the
owner of his home and not the tenant of some (perhaps) distant
landlord.""
Clearly, Congress' main purpose in land grant legislation was to
promote the settling of the west.' 9 However, the Supreme Court, by
applying the fiction that Congress' general purpose was to keep the
subsurface mineral resources for public ownership and conservation, has
implicitly concluded that Congress intended to retain all federal re-
sources.50 "The result.., is to impute to Congress an intention to promote
sound national development and conservation of federal resources." 51
When construing a statute, the court may look to a contemporaneous
interpretation of a statute by an officer or agency charged with its
administration. Thus, a court may refer to judicial interpretations of a
word in cases decided before an act was passed.53
A pre-SRHA Interior Department decision, Zimmerman v. Brun-
son," held that gravel was not to be considered a mineral under the mineral
reservations of the previous homestead laws.5 5 It was only a short time after
the Zimmerman decision that the Department of Interior began drafting
45. 103 S. Ct. at 2226 (1984).
46. Id. at 2225.
47. Id. at 2237-38 (Powell, J., dissent).
48. Id. at 2238, citingH.R. REP. No. 626, 63d Cong., 2dSess. 11 (1914) (emphasis in original).
49. Wilkinson, The Field of Public Land Law: Some Connecting Threads And Future
Directions, 1 PuB. LAND L. REv. 1, 30-31 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Wilkinson].
50. Id. at 32. Wilkinson made this statement in relation to the cases of United States v. Union
Pac. R. Co., 353 U.S. 112 (1957) and United States v. Union Oil Co., 549 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1977),
cert. deniedsub nom. Ottoboni v. United States, 435 U.S. 911 (1977). Thesecases addressed thescope
of mineral reservations and indicates how the courts interpret these types of cases.
51. Wilkinson, supra note 49, at 32.
52. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) reh'g denied, 380 U.S. 989 (1965).
53. Comment, The Meaning of Minerals In the Stock-Raising Homestead Act Mineral
Reservation, 16 LAND & WATE t L. REv. 33, 36 (1981).
54. 39 I.D. 310 (1910).
55. Id.
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the SRHA.
Both the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court minority relied on
Zimmerman as evidence that the Department of the Interior and Congress
did not intend gravel to be included as a reserved mineral when the SRHA
was enacted. The Supreme Court majority however, dismissed Zimmer-
man by stating that they could not infer that Congress was aware of the
decision, or that Congress understood that gravel was not included in the
mineral reservation. 6 Prior to the enactment of the SRHA, the Zimmer-
man decision was criticized as being inconsistent with the Department of
Interior's previous rulings 57 and was overruled in 1929 by Layman v.
Ellis.6 8 However, it cannot be ignored that the Interior Department did not
consider gravel to be a reserved mineral under the homestead laws when
the SRHA was enacted.
A. What is a "'Mineral"?
Generally, there are four tests which have been developed by the
courts to determine what is to be considered a mineral: the separate value
test, the energy resource test, the portion of the surface test and the settled
expectations test. Each will be discussed separately.
1. Separate Value Test
Prior to Zimmerman, the Department of the Interior recognized that
land containing deposits of other common substances constituted "mineral
land" if the deposits were found "in quantity and quality sufficient to
render the land more valuable on account thereof than for agricultural
purposes." 9 The Supreme Court followed this rationale in Northern
Pacific Railway v. Soderberg.6° In Soderberg the Court held that lands
chiefly valuable for granite quarries were mineral lands under an 1864
statute granting certain property to railroads. The Court reasoned that
"mineral lands include not merely metalliferous lands, but all such lands
that are chiefly valuable for their deposits of a mineral character which are
useful in the arts or valuable for the purposes of manufacture." 1
Zimmerman was not completely at odds with this approach. In that
decision, the Secretary of the Interior had stated that gravel was not to be
56. 103 S. Ct. at 2224 (1983).
57. Id. at 2224 n.7. By the time the SRHA was enacted, a leading contemporaneous treatise had
pointed out that Zimmerman was inconsistent with the Department of Interior's traditional treatment
of the issue of what was a "mineral." 2 LINDLEY ON MINES § 424 at 996 (3d ed. 1914).
58. 52 I.D. 714 (1929).
59. 103 S. Ct. 2218, 2224 n.7 (1983).
60. 188 U.S. 526 (1903).
61. Id. at 536-37.
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considered a mineral unless the deposits "[possessed] a peculiar property
or characteristic [which gave] them a special value." '
The Interior Department reaffirmed the use of this test in United
States v. Isbell Construction Co.63 In Isbell, the Department held that
gravel was a mineral" pursuant to a mineral reservation under the Taylor
Grazing Act. 5 The Department stated that, "the reservation of minerals
should be considered to sever from the surface all mineral substances which
can be taken from the soil and have a separate value.""
In Western Nuclear, the district court relied upon this test in
determining that gravel was a reserved mineral.67 The district court stated
that a substance was a mineral if it was found to be valuable at any point in
time.68 The Supreme Court followed this rationale by adopting the Isbell
language. The Court concluded that in order for a substance to be a
reserved mineral under the SRHA, it must first be capable of being "taken
from the soil and used for commercial purposes."09
The problem with this definition of mineral is that the value of a
substance is subject to change over time. Due to inflation, technological
changes or an increasing population, a substance which once had little
value may suddenly become a mineral reserved to the Federal Govern-
ment. "Thus it would appear that a gravel pit located adjacent to the right-
of-way of a proposed interstate highway might be deemed a 'valuable
mineral deposit,' whereas one remotely located might not."170
Clearly, this definition is too broad, and could conceivably include as a
"reserved mineral" anything of value either upon or under SRHA lands.
One commentator has noted that, "[lI]andowners have sold 'moss rock,'
common rock on which moss has grown, to contractors to decorate
fireplaces and homes. The rock has become 'valuable,' but it is absurd to
think that this common rock should now be included in a mineral
reservation to the government. 71
62. 39 .D. 310, 312 (1910).
63. 78 I.D. 385 (1971).
64. Id. at 391.
65. 43 U.S.C. § 315(g) (1976).
66. 78 I.D. 385, 391 (1971) (emphasis in original).
67. Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Andrus, 475 F. Supp. at 662 (D. Wyo. 1979).
68. Id.
69. 103 S. Ct. at 2229 (1983). The Supreme Court majority also relied on I AMPRICAN LAW OF
MINING § 3.26, 552 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Found. 1982) "A reservation of minerals should be
considered to sever from the surface all mineral substances which can be taken from the soil and which
have a separate value." Id.
70. Carpenter, Severed Minerals as a Deterrent to Land Development, 51 DEN. L.J. 1, 14
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Carpenter].
71. Note, Public Lands-The lnclusionof Gravel ina Mineral Reservation to the United States
Under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act. Western Nuclear v. Andrus, 18 LAND & WATER L. REV.
201, 216 (1983).
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2. Energy Resource Test
President Theodore Roosevelt first suggested to Congress that by
including a mineral reservation in land patents, public lands could be used
for production of subsurface mineral fuels, as well as for agriculture.72
In Skeen v. Lynch, 3 the Tenth Circuit determined that oil and gas
were reserved minerals under the SRHA reservation.74 In reaching this
conclusion, the court stated that the SRHA mineral reservation was to be
construed broadly.75
The Ninth Circuit continued this trend of broad interpretation in
United States v. Union Oil Company of California."6 In that case the court
found that geothermal steam used to generate electrical power was a
reserved mineral under the SRHA reservation.7 7 Even though geothermal
steam was probably not contemplated to be a reserved mineral by Congress
in 1916 ,7 the Ninth Circuit concluded that the intent of Congress was to
"reserve unrelated subsurface resources, particularly energy sources '7 0 to
the federal government.
In Western Nuclear, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the
energy resource rationale used in Union Oil, and concluded that gravel was
not a reserved mineral under the SRHA reservation. 0 The court stressed
the differences between geothermal steam and gravel. "To us, there is a
vast difference between geothermal steam and gravel. Gravel is certainly
not an unrelated subsurface energy resource."81
To strictly apply the energy resource test would eliminate precious
substances like gold and silver from the mineral reservation. Obviously,
this cannot be what Congress intended. However, as one commentator
suggests, the energy resource test should be applied to deal with new
substances, or new uses for substances.82 This construction would both
broaden the scope of the mineral reservation to include new energy
72. 41 CONG. REc. 2806 (1907). "Enactment of such legislation would provide title to... the
surface land as separate and distinct from the right to the underlying mineral fuels in regions where
these may occur."
73. 48 F.2d 1044 (10th Cir. 1931).
74. Id. at 1046.
75. Id.
76. 549 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977).
77. United States v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 549 F.2d at 1274.
78. Id. at 1273-79.
79. Id. at 1279.
80. Western Nuclear, 664 F.2d at 242. (1982).
81. Id. at 241.
82. Note, supra note 72, at 216. President Roosevelt intended the mineral reservation to reserve
the "underlying mineral fuels" from the surface estate. See supra note 72. Therefore, new substances
not commonly recognized as minerals and which are not useful as an energy resource should not be
included as a mineral under the energy resource test.
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resources, and also retain the substances commonly recognized as reserved
minerals such as gold and silver.
3. Portion of the Surface Test
This test was first applied to the SRHA mineral reservation in State
ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Trujillo.83 The New Mexico Supreme
Court concluded that because gravel formed a part of the surface and could
not be obtained without destroying the surface, and had no exceptional
characteristics distinguishing it from the surrounding soil, it was not a
mineral." However, the holding of this case has been criticized because it
appears that the court used private deed rules of construction to interpret a
patent mineral reservation.85
In State Land Board v. State Dep't of Fish and Game," the Utah
Supreme Court held that gravel was not reserved to the State under a
mineral reservation.87 They reasoned that since sand and gravel were such
widely occurring materials in the earth's surface, to reserve them to the
grantor would in many instances nullify the grant by allowing the state to
destroy the surface estate in order to obtain the gravel."
The Tenth Circuit also applied this test in Western Nuclear. The court
stated:
In our view, the gravel lying under and upon the appellant's land
is so closely related to the surface estate, that it is a part and
parcel of it. If such common substances were considered to be
included within the mineral reservation, then under all the many
patents issued pursuant to the Stock Raising Homestead Act, the
patentees would own only the dirt, and little or nothing more.89
The protection of the surface estate is a strong policy argument. to
include a substance like gravel, which makes up a part of the soil, as a
reserved mineral takes away the surface owner's sovereignty over the soil.
In effect, the patentee would merely have a grazing lease, and would be the
tenant of the mineral owner. This would be contrary to the intent of
Congress, which was to provide SRHA lands for settlement,90 allowing
each citizen to be the sovereign of a portion of the soil.91
83. State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Trujillo, 82 N.M. 694, 487 P.2d 122 (1971).
84. Id. at 696, 487 P.2d at 124.
85. Comment, supra note 54 at 40. The New Mexico Supreme Court apparently based its
decision on an A.L.R.2d annotation dealing with gravel as a reserved mineral in private deed mineral
reservations. See Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 843 (1964).
86. 17 Utah 2d 237, 408 P.2d 707 (1965).
87. Id. at 239, 408 P.2d at 708.
88. Id.
89. Western Nuclear, 664 F.2d at 242.
90. Gallinger, supra note 30, at 59.
91. See supra note 34.
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The weakness of this argument is that Congress provided for compen-
sation to the surface owner if his lands were damaged by any mining
activity.92 Because Congress expressed a national policy of conserving
mineral resources and provided a statutory procedure for the surface owner
to recover damages,9 3 "it is clear that Congress intended that the holder of
the mineral estate should be able to destroy the surface if required by his
mining operations to do so." 4
The Supreme Court majority in Western Nuclear correctly disposed
of the portion of the surface test and concluded that the surface estate was
meant to be used jointly by the patentee and the mineral entryman. 5 They
reasoned that Congress foresaw the destruction of the surface estate by
giving the mineral entryman "the right to exclusive possession of 'all the
surface included within the lines of [his] locatio [n]' and the right to extract
minerals lying beneath the surface.196 As one commentator suggests,
minerals would not be conserved for the use of future generations if the
owner of the surface could prevent mining because it interfered with the
use of the surface estate. 7
One court has applied the surface use theory to SRHA lands. In
Occidental Geothermal, Inc. v. Simmons,98 the United States District
Court for the District of Wyoming concluded that the federal government
could build and operate geothermal power plants on SRHA lands.99 They
reasoned that since geothermal steam was a reserved mineral under the
SRHA reservation, the federal government could use as much of the
surface as necessary to remove and utilize the mineral. 00
4. Settled Expectations Test
This test was first recognized in Leo Sheep Co. v. United States.' In
that case the Supreme Court held that the federal government had not
impliedly reserved an easement across land originally granted under a
92. 43 U.S.C. § 299 (1976). Section 299 states that any person who acquires from the United
States the right to mine and remove mineral deposits "may reenter and occupy so much of the surface
thereof as may be required for all purposes reasonably incident to the mining or removal of the coal or
other minerals . . . upon payment of the damages to crops or other tangible improvements to the
owner thereof."
93. Twitty, supra note 36, at 515.
94. Id. at 514.
95. Western Nuclear, 103 S. Ct. at 2226, citing H.R. REP. No. 35, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 18
(1916).
96. Western Nuclear, 103 S. Ct. at 2227, citing 30 U.S.C. § 26 (1976).
97. Twitty, supra note 36, at 515.
98. 543 F. Supp. 870 (1982).
99. Id. at 877.
100. Id. at 878.
101. 440 U.S. 668 (1979).
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railroad land grant statute.10 2 The Court stated:
Generations of land patents have issued without any express
reservation of the right now claimed by the Government. Nor has
a similar right been asserted before . . . . This Court has
traditionally recognized the special need for certainty and
predictability where land titles are concerned, and we are
unwilling to upset settled expectations .... 103
The Supreme Court dissent in Western Nuclear emphasized that the
purpose of the SRHA was to settle the West. 1 4 Homesteaders made their
claims and developed their ranches with the expectation of perpetual
ownership and control of the land.10 5 Since the SRHA was first enacted,
patentees and their successors have treated the gravel as part of their
surface estate. 0
6
The first attempt by the Department of Interior to acquire
ownership of gravel on SRHA lands did not occur until... 1975.
One would think it is now too late, after a half-century of
inaction, for the Department to take action that raises serious
questions as to the nature and extent of titles to lands granted
under the SRHA. Owners of patented land are entitled to expect
fairer treatment from their government.07
The minority correctly analyzed Leo Sheep, but incorrectly used the
Common Varieties Act of 1955108 to support their conclusions.109 Since the
surface owners had used gravel for many years prior to 1975, they were led
to believe that they owned the gravel. Sixty years of inaction by the federal
government is strong evidence that they did not consider gravel a reserved
mineral under the SRHA mineral reservation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The term "mineral" and the precise scope of the SRHA mineral
reservation cannot be expressly defined. However, substances such as sand,
102. Id. at 682.
103. Id. at 687.
104. Western Nuclear, 103 S. Ct. at 2237-38.
105. Gallinger, supra note 30, at 62.
106. Note, supra note 72, at 218.
107. Western Nuclear, 103 S. Ct. at 2238.
108. 30 U.S.C. §§ 601-615 (1976). Section 611 provides that "[n]o deposit of common varieties
of sand, stone, gravel.., shall be deemed a valuable mineral deposit within the meaning of the mining
laws so as to give effective validity to any mining claim hereafter located under such mining laws." The
Common Varieties Act appears to state that gravel is not a mineral. However, a "locatable mineral"
under the mining laws and a "reserved mineral" under the SRHA reservation are not the same thing.
Carpenter, saspra note 71; at 13-14. In fact it is the position of the Department of the Interior that
because of this difference, the change in the mining law did not affect the SRHA. United States v. Isbell
Construction Co., 78 I.D. 385, 389-90 (1971) (quoting from Solic. Op., M-36417 of Feb. 15, 1957).
109. Western Nuclear, 103 S. Ct. at 2236-37.
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gravel, and common rocks and stones should not be included in such a
definition.
The majority in Western Nuclear should have relied on Zimmerman
v. Brunson. This case represented the recognized position of the Interior
Department when the SRHA was enacted, and indicates that gravel was
not considered a mineral under the SRHA mineral reservation.
The separate value test relied upon by the majority in Western
Nuclear creates an overly broad definition of the term "mineral." It raises
more questions than it answers and will be the source of future litigation.
For these same reasons, the separate value test should not be used to
interpret the SRHA mineral reservation.
The energy resource test could be used to interpret the SRHA mineral
reservation, but a narrow reading of Union Oil would exclude such
substances as gold and silver from the definition of "mineral." However, if
Union Oil was read to apply to new energy resources, Congress' purpose of
reserving subsurface minerfal fuels would be accomplished, while retain-
ing commonly recognized minerals like gold and silver within the SRHA
mineral reservation.
The portion of the surface test should not be used. By enacting the
SRHA, Congress intended to convey the surface estate to the patentee
while reserving the subsurface energy resources. From the provisions
providing compensation to the surface owner for damages caused by
mining activity, it is clear that Congress anticipated the destruction of the
surface estate to utilize these resources.
The Supreme Court majority should have applied the settled expecta-
tions test of Leo Sheep to determine the meaning of "mineral" under the
SRHA mineral reservation. By not claiming ownership in commonly
occurring substances like gravel for nearly 60 years, the surface owners
have the right to expect that these materials were part of the surface estate.
To now take these substances away from the surface owner will raise
serious questions as to the extent of land titles granted under the SRHA. As
stated by the Supreme Court in Leo Sheep, there is a "special need for
certainty and predictability where land titles are concerned." 110
Gravel is not a valuable energy resource. Moreover, the federal
government did not claim ownership of the gravel until 60 years after the
enactment of the SRHA. In view of these facts and the Supreme Court's
decision in Leo Sheep, the Supreme Court should have held that gravel was
not a mineral reserved under the SRHA mineral reservation.
I10. Leo Sheep Co., 440 U.S. at 687.
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